UnYOLO sits between your AI agents and GitHub, handing out short-lived proxy credentials instead of letting agents touch real tokens.
What the broker does:
- Isolation — agent never holds, sees, or transmits a real credential; it receives only the API response it’s allowed to see
- Short-lived credentials — proxy tokens expire in seconds to minutes, bound to the agent’s cryptographic identity via DPoP (RFC 9449)
- TLS termination — broker runs its own CA, installed as a trust anchor on the agent host, decrypts traffic, inspects requests, then opens a fresh TLS connection upstream
- Separated concerns — policy engine and credential store are split, so compromising one doesn’t yield the other
- Audit trail — every request and response is logged and filterable in real time
The threat model is the confused deputy problem. AI agents act on whatever text they read — a GitHub issue, a file, a web page — which makes them exploitable in ways deterministic software isn’t. A prompt injection in an issue comment could instruct an agent to exfiltrate a GitHub token. If the agent never holds the token, there’s nothing to exfiltrate.
NOTE
UnYOLO targets GitHub specifically. The broader credential-broker pattern (IETF draft-hartman-credential-broker-4-agents) applies to any target API — UnYOLO narrows it to GitHub credential management.
Available now at unyolo.io. If you’re running AI agents against GitHub repos with write access, this is the architecture that stops a prompt injection from becoming a token leak.